Waterfall Rail Accident Report

By Roger Jowett, National Secretary

The report covers the following 20 major areas:

• emergency response - 28 recommendations
• design and procurement of rolling stock - 2
• driver safety systems - 3
• risk assessment and risk control proceedures - 2
• data loggers - 2
• train maintenace - 7
• alcohol and drug testing - 3
• periodical medical examination - 1
• safety document control - 7
• train driver and guard training - 7
• rail accident investigation - 11
• safety culture - 2
• OH&S - 3
• passenger safety - 14
• cooperate governance - 8
• safety reform - 1
• safety regulation - 10
• integrated safety management - 4
• implementing recommendations - 3

The report makes a number of observations including:

• the breakdown of trust between workers and management. "There were a succession of Chief Executives of the railways who had failed to provide the leadership essential to establish a safety culture". The report referred to an insular culture, which has failed to learn from experience. The report called for a fundamental cultural shift.
• a failure by the NSW Government to implement the recommendations of the 1999 Glenbrook Inquiry.
• the need for further changes to rail safety structures with the creation of separate accident and investigation bodies and the reporting of the Rail Regulator directly to Parliament rather than through the Minister for Transport.
• the dominant culture in the State Rail Authority and RailCorp was one of on-time running with safety being a secondary consideration. Drivers were induced to violate rules and procedures to meet on-time running.
• use of simulators for driver training is insufficient, as they fail to acknowledge situations where conditions are abnormal or degraded.
• policy of containment of passengers to the train is inappropriate as it did not protect passengers in a train which was on fire or subject to a terrorist attack.
• RailCorp should progressively implement level 2 Automatic Train Protection
• The regulatory reality in NSW has been closer to a defacto self-regulatory, due to the passive approach taken by the Regulator. While the regulatory regime has been altered significantly with the restructure that took place in 2004, the extent to which this has improved the ability of the Regulator to access adequate information and to properly assess the competence and capacity of the operators, remains to be seen.
• there was considerable evidence about the absence of an integrated safety management system within RailCorp. The implementation of the McInerney recommendations will be a crucial issue for the Rail Tram & Bus Union in 2005.

The NSW Government has said that Sydney's rail problems will take years to fix. The NSW Government is in political trouble because of its handling of the Sydney rail system which has its worst on-time running result ever and major confrontations occurred with the RTBU in early 2004.

An integrated response from the Government is essential - investment, long term visions and involvement of the workforce with a transparent timetable for implementation.

A recent Ministerial shuffle saw the service-cutting blame-the-union Minister get the heave ho. That's a good start to 2005.

Rail's importance to Sydney can only increase as urban density increases and the road system reaches its capacity.